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STATE OF UTAH 
FREED FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STOKER MOTOR COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; ROLAND E. G I N S -
BURG and JAMES A. KOHN; UTAH 
STATE TAX C O M M I S S I O N ; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 
and A T E X INCORPORATED, a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Mortgage foreclosure suit. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff-respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Stoker Motor Company is seeking to va-
cate summary judgment and remand case for trial. 
Case No. 
13925 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 8, 1969, the Appellant exe-
cuted and delivered to Respondent a promissory note in 
the amount of $400,000.00 payable to the Respondent 
(R-l). As security for the payment of said note^ the Ap-
pellant on the same day executed and delivered to the 
Respondent a mortgage, by which the Appellant mort-
gaged to the Respondent the property which is the sub-
ject matter of this case (R-l). The said note and mort-
gage were executed by the Appellant's president, Harold 
D. Stoker. The Appellant defaulted in the payment of 
said note. 
The Appellant thereafter by and through its presi-
dent, Harold D. Stoker, executed and delivered to the 
Respondent an Agreement dated July 31, 1973 (R-12). 
By virtue of said Agreement the Appellant again ack-
nowledged the $400,000.00 note and mortgage payable by 
the Appellant to the Respondent. As part of the said 
Agreement the Appellant agreed to pay a certain monthly 
payment on the note. It was agreed to by the parties 
that if the Appellant was in default that it would have 
sixty days from notice thereof to correct the default. The 
Appellant was in default under the terms and conditions 
of the Agreement and the Respondent gave notice to the 
Appellant of its default and demanded payment. No pay-
ment was made and the Respondent instituted this fore-
closure action. The District Court granted summary 
judgment to the Respondent and entered its decree of 
foreclosure on November 15, 1974. Pursuant to notice 
a sheriff's sale was held in Tooele County on the 31st 
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day of January, 1975. A cecrtifkate of sale was issued 
on the same date to Respondent. A receiver was ap-
pointed by the District Court on January 31, 1975, to 
take possession of the property pending the statutory 
redemption period. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND IN 
ENTERING ITS DECREE OF FORECLOS-
URE. 
Rule 56C says that a motion for summary judgment 
shall be rendered "forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Material facts in this case are not in dispute. 
There is no dispute over the fact that the Appellant's 
president, Harold D. Stoker, signed and executed and 
delivered to the Respondent the note and mortgage upon 
which this action is based. There is no dispute as to the 
contents of the note and mortgage, i.e., that the note is 
for $400,000.00 and that it is secured by certain real prop-
erty which is described in the mortgage. There is no 
dispute, furthermore, that the note and mortgage were 
in default and that the Appellant Stoker Motor Com-
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pany did not meet its obligations under the note and was 
therefore in default. There is no dispute that an Agree-
ment was entered into between the Appellant and the 
Respondent on July 31, 1973. And in that Agree-
ment the Appellant acknowledged the $400,000.00 note 
and all indebtedness due to the Respondent. There is no 
dispute that the Appellant was in default under the terms 
of this Agreement and that pursuant to said default the 
Respondent gave notice on January 7, 1974 declaring this 
Agreement in default and giving the Appellant sixty days 
in which to cure the default. There is no dispute over 
the fact that the Appellant failed to cure the default 
within sixty days and as a result the foreclosure action 
was instituted. The District Court correctly held that 
there were no material issues of fact with regard to this 
note and mortgage and that the Respondent was entitled 
to a summary judgment as a matter of law. The Appel-
lant in its brief is attempting to remand this case far 
trial so that other cases cited on page two of Appellant's 
brief can be considered by the Trial Court on remand of 
this case. The Appellant is trying to incorporate these 
previous cases into this matter before the Court and say 
that because issues of fact imay exist in those cases those 
same issues of fact exist in this case. This foreclosure 
action was started by the Respondent as a separate action 
and is based on the exhibits attached to the Respondent's 
complaint, i.e., the note and mortgage. The Respondent 
filed its motion for summary judgment and attached to 
that motion an affidavit of David Freed and a copy of 
the July 31, 1973 Agreement. The 1973 Agreement con-
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sititutes an admission by the Appellant ol the allegations 
contained in the Respondent's complaint in this action, 
i.e., that the Appellant Stoker Motor Company executed 
a promissory note in the principal amount of $400,000.00 
payable to Freed by Stokers, secured by a second mort-
gage on certain real property situated in Tooele County, 
State of Utah; that the Appellant Stoker Motor Company 
owed several accounts to the Respondent as enumerated 
in the Agreement; that the Respondent owed the Appel-
lant Stoker Motor Company no money as claimed in the 
Appellant's answer on file herein. In this July 31, 1973 
Agreement Stokers agreed to pay a certain monthly pay-
ment on the note in question. It was agreed to by the 
parties that if Stokers were in default they should have 
sixty days from notice thereof to correct the default. The 
Appellant Stoker Motor Company was in default under 
the terms and conditions of the Agreement and as stated 
in the affidavit of David Freed on file herein, on January 
7, 1974 the Respondent gave notice to the Appellant of 
its default and demanded payment. It is interesting to 
note that in the Agreement Stokers acknowledged and 
admitted owing to the Respondent on several accounts 
approximately $56,030.00. This admitted indebtedness of 
the Appellant to the Respondent corresponds with the 
indebtedness which the Respondent complained of in the 
four cases cited on pagte two of the Appellant's brief. This 
fact is admitted on page seven of the Appellant's brief 
wherein the Appellant says "It is clear that the Agree-
ment of July 31, 1973 was intended to compromise and 
settle the claim asserted by plaintiff aganfet Stoker in 
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this case, as well as plaimtiff's claims in the four Salt 
Lake County cases." The Appellant admits that the July 
31, 1973 Agreement constitutes a compromise settlement 
of the claims between the Respondent and the Appellant. 
The Appellant also claims there is an unresolved account-
ing due from the Respondent to the Appellant. The Ap-
pellant claims that because no accounting was reached 
in these previous four cases that there are disputed issues 
of fact. The Appellant has admitted that no factual issue 
exists with respect to these four cases by saying that the 
July 31, 1973 Agreement settled the claims in the "four 
Salt Lake County cases." It should be noted also that 
Appellant has had ample opportunity to seek the relief 
it claims it is entitled to in these previous four cases. 
The Appellant's Pbint III that the unresolved accounting 
precludes summary judgment is totally without merit, 
therefore, and the Appellant cannot now claim that fac-
tual issues which may have existed in those cases should 
be considered by this Court in reversing the District 
Court's decision granting summary judgment to the Re-
spondent. Furthermore if the Appellant desires an ac-
counting he is not precluded from filing a separate action 
for an accounting. 
The record before the Court does support the sum-
mary judgment awarded. The action brought by the Re-
spondent was a foreclosure action foreclosing on its secur-
ity for the $400,000.00 note which was signed and exe-
cuted by the Appellant's president, Harold D. Stoker. 
The note was in default and the Appellant has not dis-
puted that fact. There is no question but that the real 
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property which was the subject of the mortgage was de-
livered as security for the note. The only defenses as-
serted by the Appellant at the District Court were legal 
defenses which were properly considered in the District 
Court. The District Court properly decided that there 
were no material issues of fact and that the Appellant 
was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. 
In the affidavit of H. D. Stoker, president of the Appel-
lant, which affidavit was filed in opposition to Respon-
dent's motion for summary judgment, there is no dispute 
as to any of the material facts in this case (R-14). The 
first four paragraphs of said affidavit are statements con-
cerning Harold D. Stoker's authority to sign for and on 
behalf of the Appellant. Paragraph five states a conclu-
sion of law which is totally without merit. The Appellant 
claims that the four cases sitill pending in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County must be resolved before the 
amount of indebtedness of the Appellant in this action 
can be resolved. Paragraph six of the affidavit reiterates 
the Appellant's position that an accounting between the 
parties must be made before the indebtedness in this 
law suit can be established. The Appellant has admitted 
on page seven of its brief that the claims asserted in the 
four Salt Lake County cases were compromised and set-
tled by the July 31, 1973 Agreement. Even though it is 
not clear the Appellant is attempting by paragraphs five 
and six of the affidavit of H. D. Stoker to dispute the 
amount of the indebtedness under the $400,000.00 note. 
In the July 31,1973 Agreement, in paragraph three there-
of, it says: 
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"It is expressly understood and agreed that 
in the event of the default of the first mortgage 
held by Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association and/or default in the first mortgage 
held by LeGrande 0. Jones and Margaret H. 
Jones,, or default under the terms and additions 
of the first mortgage or in the terms and condi-
tions of the first mortgage or in the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement, namely, the $56,-
030.00 and the $125,000.00 to be paid, Freed 
shall notify Stoker in writing of such default and 
they shall have sixty (60) days in which to cor-
rect the same. In the event the same is not cor-
rected within sixty (60) days from notice thereof, 
then this Agreement to be of no further force and 
effect and the original amount set forth herein 
shall be due and payable, together with attor-
ney's fees." 
This language expressly porovides and the Appellant did 
agree that if in default under the July 31, 1973 Agree-
ment the original amount set foorth therein, i.e., the 
$400,000.00 and the $56,030.00 shall be due and payable, 
together with attorney's fetes. The Appellant is now es-
topped from asserting that it does not owe $400,000.00 as 
expressed in the note to the Respondent. No other facts 
have been disputed by the affidavit of Harold D. Stoker. 
Rule 56 (e) says: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided by this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere alle-
gations or denials of Ids pleading, but his re-
sponse, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
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this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
The Appellant did not set forth specific facts in the affi-
davit sufficient to show that there was a genuine issue 
for trial and on that basis the District Court properly 
granted a summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. 
The Appellant Stoker Motor Company claims that 
the execution of the note and mortgage was not a duly 
authorized act of the corporation. The July 31, 1973 
Agreement is signed by Harold D. Stoker for the cor-
poration, Stoker Motor Company. The Argumeont itself 
verifies the existence and validity of the note and mort-
gage which were also signed by Harold D. Stoker for the 
Appdlant corporation. The affidavit of David Freed 
attests to the fact that Harold D. Stoker at all times rep-
resented himself to be an agent and officer of the cor-
poration duly authorized to execute said note and mort-
gage. Harold D. Stoker at the time he signed the note 
and mortgage was president of the Appellant Stoker Mo-
tor Company. The note and mortgage attached as Ex-
hibits A and B of Respondent's complaint show that there 
is no material dispute as to the authority of Harold Stoker 
(R-l). He signed the note, Exhibit A, as president of 
the Appellant Stoker Motor Company. He signed the 
mortgage, Exhibit B, as president of the Appellant cor-
poration. The mortgage bears the corporate acknowledg-
ment. The signing of the note and mortgage by a cor-
poration's president is clearly within the apparent author-
ity of Mr. Harold Stoker. A corporation will be bound 
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by contracts or agreements of its agents if within the 
apparent scope of the agent's authority. Lumber Mart 
Company v. Buchanan, 69 Wash. 2d 658, 419 P. 2d 1002 
(1966); Walker v. Pacific Mobile Home, Inc., 68 Wash. 
2d 347, 413 P. 2d 3 (1966). 
Fin-thermore, Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-6 
(1973) says that: 
"No act of the corporation and no convey-
ance or transfer of real . . . property . . . by a 
poration shall be invalid by reason of the fact 
that the corporation was without capacity or 
power to do such act or to make . . . such con-
veyance or transfer," 
except in certain cases, none of which apply here. The 
defense of ultra vires cannot by law be asserted by the 
Appellant in this case. The defense of ultra vires was 
asserted by the Appellant in its answers to the plain-
tiff's complaint (R-9). The Appellant cites Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 16-10-74, for the proposition that in 
order for a corporation to mortgage substantially all of 
the assets of the corporation, that such acts be authorized 
by the corporation's board of directors and be adopted 
by a resolution of the stockholders. The Utah Supreme 
Court has however in Grover v. Gam, 23 U. 2d 441, 464 
P. 2d 598 (1970), held that a contract for sale of real 
property executed by owners of substantially all of the 
stock of the corporation was binding upon the corpora-
tion notwithstanding the fact that the seller had not com-
plied with the procedure set forth in Section 16-10-74. 
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The Grovers sold a dryfarm in Idaho to the Gains on a 
contract. On the contract the seller appeared as a cor-
poration Arthur N. Graver Farms, Inc. and was signed 
by the corporation's vice-president and attested to by 
its secretary. The Trial Court found the Gravers were 
bound by a contract as a corporation and individually. 
On appeal the Gravers argued that the contract for sale 
was invalid because it was not authorized by the board 
of directors. The Supreme Court held the corporation 
was bound by the contract even though there had been 
no formal stockholders' meeting, and no resolution from 
the board of directors. See also Amos v. Bennion, 18 U. 
2d 251, 420 P. 2d 47 (1966), where it was held that a 
corporation is bound by the acts of its president. The 
Appellant is estopped as a matter of law from now claim-
ing its agent and president was not authorized to execute 
the note and mortgage to the Respondent or that Harold 
D. Stoker was not authorized to execute the July 31,1973 
Agreement. I t should also be mentioned that Utah Code, 
Section 16-10-74 inures to the benefit of shareholders and 
is not assertable by the corporation itself. U-Beva Mines 
v. Toledo Mining Company, 24 U. 2d 351, 471 P. 2d 867 
(1970). The court said in U-Beva: 
"Toledo had no reason to believe that the 
lease had not been authorized by the stockhold-
ers, or that such authorization was required be-
cause it was the only asset of the company,— 
the latter fact not being completely established, 
but only stated to be so by one of the U-Beva 
officers—four years after the lease's execution9 
and only after termination asserted." Id. at 869. 
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The note and mortgage in this case were executed on 
November 8,. 1969 and a subsequent Agreement affirming 
the note and mortgage was executed by the corporation 
by the Appellant's president on July 31, 1973 and it was 
not until this foreclosure action was instituted that the 
Respondent had any reason to believe that the docu-
ments had not been authorized by the stockholders. 
The Appellant also asserted in its answer to Respon-
dent's complaint that the Respondent waived and was 
estopped from exercising its right to foreclose on the note 
and mortgage in question. The facts are clear that Freed 
gave the Appellant more than reasonable notice of its 
intent to declare the balance in default and of its inten-
tion to foredose. There can be no honest dispute that 
the Respondent intended to exercise its rights under the 
note and mortgage. The Respondent did not at any 
time do anything which would constitute a waiver of its 
right to foreclose. In Owen v. Mecham, 9 Ariz. 529, 454 
P. 2d 577 (1966), it was bald that the acceptance of late 
payments did not constitute a waiver of the mortgagee's 
right to foreclose. This same rule applies in Utah. In 
American Savings and Loan Association v. Blomquist, 
21 U. 2d 289, 445 P. 2d 1 (1968), the Utah Supreme Count 
held that where the mortgagee sent a letter to the mort-
gagor demanding strict performance of the payment pro-
visions and giving notification of the amount due and 
then seeking to collect the late charge, there was no 
waiver of the mortgagee's right to accelerate the debt 
where the existing delinquency remains uncured. Once 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
Freed Finance Company notified the Appellant Stoker 
Motor Company that the Appellant was in default, it 
did nothing which could be construed as a waiver. The 
Respondent gave the Appellant more than reasonable 
notice of default and a reasonable opportunity to pay, 
i.e., sixty days from and after receiving notification. The 
Respondent is not estopped from assoreting default. The 
Appellant agreed to these terms on July 31, 1973 and 
it cannot now say it was unreasonable. 
The Agreement of July 31, 1973 and the affidavit of 
David Freed and cases cited herein show that as a matter 
of law the Respondent has not waived and is not estopped 
from declaring the note in default and foreclosing on its 
mortgage. 
The Appellant on the other hand is estopped from 
asserting that the note and mortgage were not supported 
by legal, adequate and proper consideration. The note 
and mortgage were signed November 8, 1969 by the Ap-
pellant's authorized representative to satisfy the Ap-
pellant's indebtedness to the Respondent. Again on July 
31, 1973 the Appellant's same representative executed 
the Agreement for and on behalf of the Appellant. Again 
the debt was acknowledged and admitted by the Appel-
lant. The note and mortgage were evidence of an indebt-
edness admitted by the Appellant. There is no issue as 
to any material facts on this question. The Appellant re-
ceived money from the Respondent and was indebted to 
the Respondent at the time the Appellant executed the 
note and mortgage. 
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The Appellant is also estopped from now claiming 
the note and mortgage were executed as a result of mutual 
mistake as to the claimed indebtedness of the Appellant 
or that said indebtedness resulted from a misrepresenta-
tion by the Respondent to the Appellant as to the amount 
of said indebtedness. Again the July 31, 1973 Agreement 
speaks for itself. It constitutes an admission by the Ap-
pellant as to the amount of the indebtedness. The Ap-
pellant cannot now assert that it signed a note for 
$400,000.00 and an Agreement three years later acknowl-
edging said indebtedness, that it did not know how much 
it owed to the Respondent. 
SUMMARY 
There are no issues as to any material facts in this 
case and the Trial Court correctly granted summary judg-
ment to Respondent as a matter of law. All disputed 
factual issues have been admitted by virtue of the July 
31, 1973 Agreement or settled by the affidavit of David 
Freed on file herein and by the Appellant's admissions 
in its brief herein. The Respondent respectfully asks this 
Court to affirm the decision by the Trial Court granting 
summary judgment to the Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Clark Burt and 
Louis H. Callister, Sr. 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
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